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We analyze the effect of collective action vs green/environmentally aware consumers on 
ambient  environmental  quality  and  market  equilibrium.  We  consider  a  model  with  two 
types  of  consumers  who  differ  in  their  willingness-to-pay  for  a  good  available  in  two 
different environmental qualities, and two competing firms: one selling the good of high 
environmental quality and the other of low environmental quality. We show that collective 
action by green consumers reduces competition and leads to higher prices for the good of 
both qualities. Though it improves the ambient environmental quality, it may reduce the 
welfare of both types of consumers. 
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An increasing number of consumption goods such as organic food are perceived to be of 
higher environmental quality. Consumer’s preference to buy goods from less polluting 
firms is well known, especially in developed countries, and is often revealed through 
increased willingness-to-pay for goods viewed as "green", that is, those produced with 
the help of environmentally friendly technologies or with the use of less polluting inputs.  
 
Consumption of green goods often generates both private and public benefits. For 
example, a consumer benefits directly from consuming organic food because it is more 
nutritious and healthier with fewer risks to personal health from pesticides and herbicide 
residues.
2 Another example is organic skin-care products like organic soap which is 
perceived to be less harmful to the skin than conventional soap containing synthetic 
ingredients/chemicals. Arora and Cason (1995, 1996), Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), 
Khanna and Damon (1999), and Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) show that such 
private benefits from the consumption of a green good can induce consumers to pay more 
for it and firms to invest in cleaner technologies. However, Erikkson (2004) shows that 
though this may internalize the negative externalities from the production of the good to 
some extent, it may have only a modest impact and lead to only a small reduction in total 
pollution. 
 
Besides the direct private benefits to individual consumers, consumption of green goods 
also generates indirect public benefits as it helps in preserving the environment. 
Continuing with the example of organic food, organic farms are more sustainable and 
environmentally better than conventional farms because they do not release synthetic 
pesticides or herbicides into the environment. Thus, consumption of organic food not 
                                                 
2 This is different from the “warm glow” effect (see Andreoni (1989) and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002)) when 
a consumer drives additional utility from the consumption of a cleaner good simply from knowing that it 
will not contribute to pollution.    2
only directly benefits a consumer, but also helps in preserving and sustaining diverse 
ecosystems which indirectly benefit all consumers.  
 
Cremer and Thisse (1999), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), Erikkson (2004), and 
Conrad (2005) consider models of price competition and product differentiation when 
consumers are environmentally aware. These models address many important questions 
concerning the impact of green consumerism on market equilibrium and the role of 
various economic instruments for bringing improvements in the ambient environmental 
quality. However, they all assume individual action by environmentally aware 
consumers. Since each consumer acting individually cannot be assumed to take into 
account the impact of his consumption on total pollution or the ambient environmental 
quality, as it is negligible, the ambient environmental quality in these models is assumed 
to be exogenously given. For instance, when a consumer buys organic food, he is 
unlikely to think that it will help preserve the environment or the ecosystem in any 
significant way. But he buys it because of its health benefits to him. Accordingly, each 
consumer in these models is assumed to think that it is the aggregate and not the 
individual consumption that determines the ambient environmental quality and the public 
benefits from the consumption of cleaner goods are ignored from the analysis.  
 
However, if consumers come together and decide collectively whether or not to buy a 
good, then they can influence the total pollution level or the ambient environmental 
quality. For instance, if all consumers sharing a common economic-ecological system 
come together and collectively decide to buy only organic food, then besides the private 
benefits from the consumption of the organic food the consumers will also benefit from 
an improved ambient environmental quality.
3 In fact, this might be the reason why 
consumers sometimes do come together and decide collectively to buy only organic food. 
The Organic Consumers Association (OCA) in the US is one such example of 
                                                 
3 The underlying assumption here is that the consumers share a common environment in which both 
consumption and production take place.   3
mobilization of hundreds of thousands of consumers who buy only organic food.
4 How 
does such collective action by environmentally aware consumers affect the ambient 
environmental quality and prices of a good available in different environmental qualities? 
Does such collective action decrease or increase the profits of firms? This paper begins to 
analyze the impact of such collective action by green consumers on market equilibrium, 
ambient environmental quality, and consumer welfare.  
 
We consider a model with two types of consumers: one with a high willingness- to- pay 
for a good available in different environmental qualities and the other with a low 
willingness- to- pay, and two competing firms: one selling a good of high environmental 
quality and the other of low environmental quality. We assume that the consumers with 
the high willingness-to pay may decide collectively to buy the good of high 
environmental quality so as to encourage cleaner production. Since such collective action 
by the consumers can improve the ambient environmental quality, we treat ambient 
environmental quality as a choice variable in the consumer’s utility maximization 
problem.  
 
Our analysis throws up some interesting results. We show that collective action, 
especially by the consumers with a high willingness-to-pay for the good of higher 
environmental quality, reduces competition and leads to higher prices for the good of 
both qualities. This comes from the fact that coming together of the consumers and 
collective action by them internalizes the negative externalities from the production of the 
good to a greater extent and allows the firm producing the good of higher environmental 
quality to charge a higher price. Though such collective action improves the ambient 
environmental quality and provides the firms stronger incentives to adopt cleaner 
technology, it may reduce the welfare of both types of consumers.  This obviously has 
some important policy implications: rather than opposing collective action by green 
consumers, the firms may be better off supporting it. Collective action is equivalent to 
                                                 
4 It is an association of consumers to promote a more responsible and sustainable approach to food 
production. Similarly, consumers have come together to stop buying PVC (polyvinyl chloride) products 
from retailers like Wal-Mart who sell such products.   4
foregoing free riding which allows the firm to charge the consumers for the positive 
externality from its cleaner production of the good.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in section 2. In 
section 3, we characterize the market equilibrium under the assumption that the 
consumers act individually. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium when the 
consumers act collectively to decide the quality of the good they should buy. Section 5 
analyzes the impact of such collective action by the consumers on the market 
equilibrium, the ambient environmental quality, and consumer welfare. Section 5 draws 
the conclusion.   
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a model with two firms both of which produce a physically homogeneous 
good of different environmental qualities. The environmental quality of the good depends 
on the cleanliness of the technology used to produce it - the cleaner the technology, the 
higher the perceived environmental quality of the good. 
 
We assume that the cost of producing one unit of the good of environmental quality s is 
) (s c  with  ) (s c′ >0 and  ) (s c′ ′ >0. To keep matters simple, we assume that the good can be 
produced in only two environmental qualities: high, to be denoted by  , H s  and low, to be 
denoted by  . L s Let  ) ( H H s c c ≡  and  ) ( L L s c c ≡ . Without loss of generality, we assume 
that firm 1 produces the low quality  , L s and firm 2 produces the high quality  . H s  
 
We consider a population of consumers (who share the same economic-ecological 
system) with different preferences/willingness-to-pay for the good of both qualities. We 
assume that each consumer buys either none or one unit of the good. The consumers are 
environmentally aware and willing to pay a higher price for the good if it is of higher 
environmental quality. The utility of a consumer who buys one unit of the good of quality 
s is 
   5
S p s U + − =θ                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                              
where  p is the price of one unit of the good of quality  , s  θ  is consumer’s preference for 
the good, and S  represents the average ambient environmental quality. To keep matters 
simple, we assume that there are only two types of consumers with preferences as  H θ  and 
L θ  with  H θ > L θ . Let λ denote the proportion of consumers with low preference for 
quality of the good and  λ − 1  the proportion of consumers with high preference for 
quality of the good.  
 
If s and t are the qualities of the good purchased by the low- and high- type consumers, 
respectively, the average ambient environmental quality   . ) 1 ( t s S λ λ − + =  Under our 
assumption,  }. , { , H L s s t s ∈  
 
Let  L p  and  H p  denote the prices of one unit of the good of low and high environmental 
qualities, respectively. We assume that firms set prices of the good of high and low 
qualities so as to maximize their profits, given the preferences of the consumers. In order 
to rule out cases in which a firm may not find it profitable to sell its product to some 
consumers, we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1:  0 > − L L L c s θ  and  . 0 > − H H L c s θ  
 
Since  , L H θ θ >  Assumption 1 also implies  0 > − L L H c s θ  and  0 > − H H H c s θ . 
Furthermore, if  , 0 ≥ − p s L θ  then  0 > − p s H θ , which means that if a low-type consumer 
is willing to buy the good of quality  , s  then so is a high-type consumer. Thus, it is never 
the case that the low-type consumers buy the good of some quality, but the high-type 
consumers do not buy the good of any quality. Since  L H θ θ >  and  L H s s > , the two 
inequalities  L L L H H L p s p s − > − θ θ  and  H H H L L H p s p s − > − θ θ   can never hold at the 
same time whatever be the prices  L p  and  . H p Thus, it is never the case that the low-type   6
consumers buy the good of high quality and the high-type consumers buy the good of low 
quality.  
 
In order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 2:  . 1 ) 1 ( λ θ λ λθ θ − + <
−
−
− + ≤ H
L H
L H
L H s s
c c
    
 
Since  , L H θ θ >  Assumption 2 is satisfied only if  , ) ( L H L H H c c s s − < − θ i.e., if the cost of 
production increases by more than the willingness-to-pay.  
 
3. Individual action and equilibrium prices 
 
In this section, we adopt the standard assumption in this literature that each consumer 
acting individually takes the ambient environmental quality as given and ignores it from 
his utility function, even though his utility depends on it. As noted in the introduction to 
the paper, consumption of green goods by a consumer generates both private and public 
benefits as it reduces total pollution and improves the ambient environmental quality. 
However, when consumers act individually, each one thinks that the impact of his 
consumption on the total pollution or the ambient environmental quality is negligible, 
that is, it is the aggregate, rather than the individual consumption that affects the ambient 
environmental quality. A consumer’s decision to buy a green good is then motivated 
entirely by his own private benefits from its consumption. Accordingly, in this section, 
we will ignore the average ambient environmental quality S  from the utility functions of 
both types of consumers. 
 
There are five types of equilibriums  possible: (1) the high-type consumers buy the good 
of low quality and the low-type consumers do not buy the good of any quality, (2) both 
types of consumers buy the good of low quality, (3) the low-type consumers buy the good 
of low quality and the high-type consumers buy the good of high quality, (4) the low-type   7
consumers buy the good of high quality and the high-type consumers buy the good of low 
quality, and (5) both type consumers buy the good of high quality.   
 
These do not include the possibility of an equilibrium in which the low-type consumers 
buy the good of low-quality, but the high-type consumers do not buy the good of any 
quality, since, as noted, it is never the case that the low-type consumers buy the good of 
some quality, but the high-type consumers do not buy the good of any quality. 
Equilibrium of type (4) is ruled out by Assumption 1, which, as noted, implies that it is 
never the case that the low-type consumers buy the good of high quality and the high-
type consumers buy the good of low quality. 
 
Existence of type (5) equilibrium requires  L L L H H L c s p s − ≥ − θ θ  or   ≥ − ) ( L H L s s θ  
, L H L H c c c p − ≥ −  which is ruled out by Assumption 2. We thus consider only type (1), 
(2), and (3) equilibriums. 
 
It is convenient to first prove the existence of a type (2) equilibrium in which both types 
of consumers buy only the good of low quality. Such an equilibrium is a pair  ) , ( H L p p  
such that 
 
, 0 ≥ − L L L p s θ , 0 ≥ − L L H p s θ L L c p ≥ , and  . H H c p =                                                     (1) 
 
H H L L L L p s p s − ≥ − θ θ  and  . H H H L L H p s p s − ≥ − θ θ                                                    (2) 
 
Since  , L H θ θ >  inequality (1) implies  0 > − L L H p s θ . Thus, in this equilibrium both types 
of consumers buy the good of low quality and the profit of firm 1 is  . L L c p −  Since 
L H θ θ > and  , L H s s >  the first inequality in (2) is weaker than the second inequality in 
(2). 
 
Substituting, from the first inequality in (2) and using  , H H c p =   ≥ − L L L p s θ    8
0 > − + − H H L L L L L c s s s θ θ θ  (using Assumption 1). Since, as already noted, the first 
inequality in (2) is weaker than the second, this means that  0 > − L L L p s θ  and thus 
0 > − L L H p s θ  for all prices  L p  that satisfy the second inequality in (2). Since the firms 
maximize profits, the second inequality in (2) must hold with equality. Thus, this 
equilibrium is defined by the inequalities (1) and  
 
. H H H L L H c s p s − = − θ θ                                                                                                      (3) 
 
Furthermore, it should not be possible for firm 1 to raise its price and obtain higher 
profits. Define  L p′  such that  
 
. H H L L L L c s p s − = ′ − θ θ                                                                                                      (4) 
 
Comparing (3) and (4) and using  L H s s >  and  , L H θ θ >  it follows that   . L L p p > ′  If firm 
1 raises its price of low quality good to  , L p′  then only the low-type consumers will buy 
from it and high-type consumers will switch to the good of high quality sold by firm 2. 
Thus, the profit of firm 1 will be then equal to ). ( L L c p − ′ λ  Since  ) , ( H L p p  is an 
equilibrium, it must be the case that 
 
. ) ( L L L L c p c p − ≤ − ′ λ                                                                                                         (5) 
 
Substituting from (3) and (4), inequality (5) is equivalent to  
 




). )( 1 ( ) )( ( L H L H L H c c s s − − ≤ − − λ λθ θ  
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Assumption 2 implies that this inequality is indeed true. Using equality (3), the profit of 
firm 1 is  
 
). ( 1 L H H L H L H H H L H L L s s c c c s c s c p − − − = − − + = − = θ θ θ π                                     (6) 
 
By Assumption 2,  . 0 1 > π   
 
Since the maximum price at which firm 1 can sell its product to the high-type consumer 
is  L Hs θ , type (1) equilibriums is ruled out if  ). )( 1 ( 1 L L H c s − − > θ λ π  Substituting from 
(6), this inequality is equivalent to  ). ( ) ( L H H L H s s c c λ θ λ − > −  In view of Assumption 2, 
this inequality clearly holds if the distribution parameter λ  is sufficiently large, but less 
than 1, i.e., if the proportion of low-type consumers is sufficiently high.  
 
We now drive the condition which rules out the existence of type (1) equilibrium. Such 
an equilibrium is possible only if  ). ( ) )( 1 ( 1 L H H L H L L s s c c c p − − − = ≥ − − θ π λ  By 
Assumption 2, the right hand side of this inequality is strictly positive. Type (1) 
equilibrium is thus ruled out if the distribution parameterλ  is sufficiently large, but less 
than 1. 
  
We show next that Assumption 2 rules out the possibility of type (3) equilibrium in 
which the low-type consumers buy the good of low quality and the high-type consumers 
of high quality. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is a price pair  ) , ( H L p p  such that, 
 
 
0 ≥ − L L L p s θ ,  , 0 ≥ − H H H p s θ   , 0 ≥ − L L c p   0 ≥ − H H c p                                             (7) 
 
 
L L H H H H p s p s − ≥ − θ θ                                                                                                    (8) 
 
 
H H L L L L p s p s − ≥ − θ θ                                                                                                      (9) 
 
   10
 
The inequalities in (7) denote the participation constraints of the consumers and the firms. 
Inequalities (8) and (9) represent the self-selection constraints of the high- and low-type 
consumers, respectively.  
 
Since  ) , ( H L p p  is an equilibrium, it should not be possible for firm 1 to lower its price  
such that, besides the low-type consumers, the high-type consumers also prefer to buy the 
good of low quality and the profit of firm 1 is higher. Thus, if  L L p p < ′  and 




L L L H H H H c p s p s ) 1 ( λ λ θ θ − − − ≥ −                                                                               (10) 
 
  
Similarly, firm 2 should not be able to lower its price such that its profit is higher. That is, 
H H p p < ′  and  , L L L H H L p s p s − = ′ − θ θ then  ). )( 1 ( H H H H c p c p − − ≤ − ′ λ  Substituting for 
H p′  and reorganizing, this inequality is equivalent to                                                                                         
 
H H H L L L L c p s p s λ λ θ θ − − − ≥ − ) 1 (                                                                               (11) 
 
Comparing inequalities (8) and (10), it is seen that inequality (8) is implied by 
inequalities (10) and  , L L c p ≥  as in (7). Similarly comparing inequalities (9) and (11), it 
is seen that inequality (9) is implied by inequalities (11) and  , H H c p ≥ as in (7). 
Therefore, type (3) equilibrium, if it exists, is a price pair  ) , ( H L p p  that satisfies 
inequalities (7), (10), and (11). 
 
Since firms maximize profits, we solve for the equilibrium prices by taking (10) and (11) 
as equalities.  Thus the equilibrium prices are 
 




) 1 ( ) ) 1 )(( (
λ λ
λ λ θ θ λ
+ −
+ − + − − −
=
H L L H L H
L
c c s s









λ λ λθ θ
+ −
+ − + − −
=
H L L H L H
H
c c s s
p                                                               (13) 
 
    
After some algebra and using Assumption 2, it can be verified that the so-defined prices 
L p  and  H p  satisfy the participation constraints (7) if the distribution parameter λ  is 
sufficiently large, but less than 1. Thus, the profit of firm 1 is  
 
 
). ( 1 L L c p − = λ π  
 
 




) 1 ( 1
) ( ) ) 1 )(( (
1 >
− −
− + − − −
=
λ λ
λ θ θ λ
λ π
L H L H L H c c s s
                                                      
 
 
by Assumption 2. Similarly, the profit of firm 2 is  
 
 
). )( 1 ( 2 H H c p − − = λ π  
 
 





) )( 1 ( ) )( (
) 1 (




− − − − −
− =
L H L H L H c c s s
                                                
 
 
However, Assumption 2 implies  . 0 2 < π  This shows that there exits no type (3) 
equilibrium. 
   12
Hence, we have shown that, if consumers act individually and the proportion of low-type 
consumers is sufficiently large, then there exists an equilibrium of type (2) which is 
unique.  It is defined by inequalities (1) and (3).  
 
4. Collective action and equilibrium prices 
 
Having defined the equilibrium for the case when the consumers act individually, we 
analyze next the case in which the consumers act collectively. As noted in the 
introduction to the paper, environmentally aware consumers may mobilize themselves 
and decide collectively to buy only the good of higher environmental quality. The 
consumers realize that when they act collectively they can influence the total pollution or 
the ambient environmental quality.  
 
Such collective action is likely to lead to an improvement in the ambient environmental 
quality. But it is not clear how it might affect the market prices, profits of the firms, and 
consumer welfare. 
 
We assume that the high-type of consumers form a group and decide collectively whether 
to buy or not the high quality good. They realize that they can influence the ambient 
environmental quality. Hence, the high-type consumers no longer take the ambient 
environmental quality S  as exogenously given, and it now enters their utility as a choice 
variable. The aggregate environmental quality  , ) 1 ( t s S λ λ − + =  if s and t are the 
qualities of the good purchased by the low- and high- type consumers, respectively. 
Under our assumptions,  }. , { , H L s s t s ∈  Let  p and qbe the prices of the good of qualities 
s and  , t  respectively. Then, the utility of a low-type consumer who buys one unit of the 
good of quality s is  t p s S p s U L L ) 1 ( ) ( λ λ θ θ − + − + = + − =  and the utility of a high-
type consumer who buys the good of quality t is  q t U H − − + = ) 1 ( λ θ + . s λ  
 
Since  , L H θ θ >  if  0 ≥ − p s L θ  then  0 ) 1 ( > − − + p s H λ θ , which means that if a 
consumer with the low preference  for quality and acting individually is willing to buy   13
the good of quality  , s  then so is a consumer with the high preference for quality and 
acting collectively. Thus, it can never be the case that the low-type consumers buy the 
good of some quality, but the high-type consumers do not buy the good of any quality. 
Since  L H θ θ >  and  , L H s s > whatever be the prices ( H L p p , ) the two inequalities 
L L L H H L p s p s − > − θ θ  and  H H H L L H p s p s − − + > − − + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( λ θ λ θ  cannot hold at the 
same time. In words, whatever the prices  L p  and  H p  it is never the case that the low-
type consumers acting individually buy the good of high quality, but the high-type 
consumers buy the good of low quality. 
   
We assume that while the high-type consumers form a group and engage in collective 
action, the low-type consumers continue to act individually. In order to analyze the effect 
of such collective action by the high-type consumers on the prices and profitability of the 
firms, we first characterize the market equilibrium.  
 
 An equilibrium is a pair  ) , ( H L p p  such that 
 
, 0 ≥ − L L L p s θ   , 0 ≥ − L L c p   0 ≥ − H H c p                                                                      (14) 
 
H H L L L L p s p s − ≥ − θ θ                                                                                                    (15) 
 
L L L H H H H H s p s s p s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( λ θ λ θ − + − ≥ − + −                                                              (16) 
 
Inequality (16) highlights the fact that the high-type of consumers decide collectively 
whether to buy the good of high or low quality taking as given the quality bought by the 
low-type consumers. 
 
Since the firms engage in price competition, firm 2 should not be able to lower its price 
such that, besides the group of the high-type consumers, the low-type consumers also 
prefer to buy the good of high quality and firm 2 finds it profitable to sell the good of   14
high-quality to both types of consumers than to only the high-type consumers, that is, if 
H p′  is such that 
 
L L L H H L p s p s − > ′ − θ θ , then  ). )( 1 ( H H H H c p c p − − ≤ − ′ λ                                           (17) 
 
Thus,  ) , ( H L p p  should be such that 
 
. ) 1 ( H H H L L L L c p s p s λ λ θ θ − − − ≥ −                                                                              (18) 
 
Similarly, it should not be possible for firm 1 to lower its price such that, besides the low-
type consumers, the high-type consumers also collectively decide to buy the low-quality 
good and its profit is higher, that is, if  L p′  is such that 
 
H H H H L L L H s p s s p s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( λ θ λ θ − + − > − + ′ − , then  ). ( L L L L c p c p − ≤ − ′ λ                (19)                              
 
Note that we can ignore the constraint  H H L L L L p s p s − > ′ − θ θ  because it is weaker than 
inequality (19). Thus,  ) , ( H L p p  should be such that 
 
L L L L H H H H H s c p s s p s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( λ λ λ θ λ θ − + − − − ≥ − + − .                                        (20) 
  
Clearly, inequalities (15) and (16) are weaker than inequalities (18) and (20), 
respectively. Thus, inequalities (14), (18) and (20) define the equilibrium. Since the firms 
maximize profits, inequalities (18) and (20) must hold with equality in equilibrium. Thus, 
) , (
* *






) 1 ( ) ) 1 )( 1 )(( (
λ λ
λ λ θ λ θ λ
+ −
+ − + − − + − −
=
H L L H L H
L
c c s s
p                                            (21) 
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.
1





λ λ λθ λ θ
+ −
+ − + − − + −
=
H L L H L H
H
c c s s
p                                                 (22) 
 
As in the case of prices  L p  and  , H p  defined in (12) and (13), it can be verified that the 
so-defined prices 
*
L p  and 
*
H p  also satisfy the participation constraints (14) if λ  is 
sufficiently large, but less than 1. In fact, the larger the  , λ  smaller the difference between 
L p  and 
*
L p  or  H p  and  .
*
H p  
 
Assumption 2 implies  . 0










λ θ λ θ λ
λ λ π
+ −
− + − − + − −
= − =
L H L H L H
L L
c c s s
c p                            
 




) )( 1 ( ) ) 1 )(( (




λ λθ λ θ
λ λ π
+ −
− − − − − + −
− = − − =
L H L H L H
H H
c c s s
c p  
 
Proposition 1:  Collective action by high-type consumers leads to higher prices of the 
good of both qualities. 
 
Proof: Using Assumption 2, 
 
) 1 ( 1




λ λ θ λ λθ λ
− −
+ − + −
−
−












       
        
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( ) ( )) 1 ( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 2
λ λ
λ λ θ λ λ λ
− −
+ − + − − − − − −
=
H L L H L L H c c s s c c
 
   16
            ). ( L H L H s s c − − = θ                                                                                               (23) 
 
Since  , L H θ θ <  it follows from (3) that  .
*
L L p p >  Similarly, using Assumption 2,  
 
.
) 1 ( 1




H L L H
H c
c c c c
p =
− −






It follows from (1) that  .
*
H H p p >  
 
When high-type consumers collectively decide which quality of the good to buy, they 
internalize the externality associated with the consumption of the good. This impacts the 
market equilibrium in two different ways.  
 
First, it allows the firm producing the good of high quality to charge a higher price. 
Accordingly, this firm now earns positive profits, which are equal to  ) 1 ( λ −  
, 0 ) (
* > − H H c p  as shown. 
 
Second, it reduces competition and as a result the firm producing the good of low quality 
is also able to charge a higher price. However, the impact of this on the profit of firm 1 is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the profit of firm 1 should be higher because it is able to 
charge a higher price for the good produced by it, but on the other hand, the profit should 
be lower because fewer consumers buy the good. The profit of firm 1 in the two cases are 
)) ( ( ) ( L H H L H L L s s c c c p − − − = − θ  and  ) (
*
L L c p − λ  which, using (22), is not less than 
)). ( ( L H L L H s s c c − − − θ λ  Since  , , L H H L s s > <θ θ  and  , 1 < λ  the profit of firm 1 may be 
higher or lower depending on the distribution parameter  , λ  the difference in the 
willingness- to- pay  L H θ θ -  of the two types of consumer, and the difference in the 
quality L H s s − . If the number of consumers with higher willingness-to-pay is small (i.e. 
λ  is large), the profit of firm 1 is more likely to be higher.  It was shown above that 
collective action by the consumers leads to a positive profits for firm 2. This means that   17
both firms stand to gain from collective action by the high-type consumers, especially if 
the proportion of such consumers is not high.  
 
5. Collective action and consumer welfare                                                                                                
     
We have shown that collective action by high-type consumers leads to higher prices for 
the good of both qualities, and higher profits for both the firms if proportion of the low-
type consumers is sufficiently high. Since the high-type consumers switch to the good of 
high environmental quality, it also leads to an improved ambient environmental quality. 
We now examine whether the improvement in the ambient environmental quality is 
sufficient to outweighs the increase in prices and improve the overall welfare of the 
consumers. 
 
Proposition 2: Collective action by the high-type consumers may lower the welfare of 
both types of consumers. 
 
Proof: Since in the absence of collective action by the high-type consumers only the 
good of low quality is produced and consumed, the average ambient environmental 
quality  . L s S = The welfare of a low-type consumer is then   
 
, L L L L L s p s W + − =θ                                                                                                        
 
and that of a high-type consumer is  
 
, L L L H H s p s W + − =θ  
 
Substituting for  L p  from (3) 
 
, ) ( L H L H H L L L s c s s s W + − − + = θ θ                                                                                (24) 
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= H W . ) ( L H H H L H L H H L H s c s s c s s s + − = + − − + θ θ θ  
 
When the high-type consumers act collectively the average ambient environmental 
quality  . ) 1 ( H L s s S λ λ − + =  The welfare of a low-type consumer is then  
            
, ) 1 (
* *
H L L L L L s s p s W λ λ θ − + + − =                                                                                    
 
and that of the high-type consumer is  
 
, ) 1 (
* *
H L H H H H s s p s W λ λ θ − + + − =  
 
where, as shown,  .
*
L L p p >  Using Assumption 2 and inequality (23), 
 
. ) 1 ( ) (
*
H L L H L H L L L s s s s c s W λ λ θ θ − + + − + − <                                                            (25) 
 
Comparing (24) and (25),  L L W W <
*  if   . ) 1 ( H L θ λ θ ≤ − +  Since  , H L θ θ <  this is indeed 
true if λ  is sufficiently large. 
 
Next, we compare  H W  and 
*
H W  are not generally comparable. Substituting from (22), 
 
. ) 1 (
1





H L L H L H
H H H s s
c c s s
s W λ λ
λ λ
λ λ λθ λ θ
θ − + +
+ −
+ − + − − + −
− =  
 
Thus,  H H W W ≥
*  if and only if 
 
≥ − − ) )( 1 ( L H s s λ .
1




H L L H L H c
c c s s
−
+ −
+ − + − − + −
λ λ
λ λ λθ λ θ
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                             .
) 1 ( 1
) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 (
) (
λ λ












s s                             (26) 
 
Assumption 2 implies that the right hand side of this inequality is positive. Therefore, this 
inequality is not true, if the distribution parameter λ  is sufficiently large, but less than 1. 
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
 
We have shown that collective action by high-type consumers may reduce the welfare of 
both types of consumers, especially if the proportion of low-type consumers is 
sufficiently large. However, we obtained this result by ignoring the profits of the firms 
from our calculation of consumer welfare.  It is more reasonable to assume that the 
consumers with a higher preference for environmental quality are share holders of the 
cleaner firm and thus include the profit of this firm in the calculations for the welfare of 
these consumers. Doing so does not reverse Proposition 2 except that the parameter λ   
should be larger. This is seen as follows: 
 
Let ) )( 1 (
* * * *
H H H H c p W W − − + = λ  where  ) )( 1 (
*
H H c p − −λ  is the profit of firm 2. Then, 
H H W W ≥
* *  if and only if 
 
≥ + − − ) )( 1 ( H L H c s s λ   .
) 1 ( 1
) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 (
) (
λ λ













s s  
 





Our model begins with the observation that consumption of green goods may generate 
both private and a public benefits. It departs from the standard models of product   20
differentiation which take the ambient environmental quality as exogenously given. To 
the best of our knowledge this is the first model in which the ambient environmental 
quality is determined endogenously. It is also the first model that introduces and analyzes 
collective action by consumers in a differentiated duopoly model. Obviously, similar 
analysis is possible in many other contexts. For example, if agents decide collectively to 
choose between two alternative networks differing in quality. Such collective action can 
raise the quality of the network they join.    
 
Our analysis shows that collective action by consumers is equivalent to their foregoing 
free riding which internalizes the externality to a greater extent.  This enables the less 
polluting firm to charge a higher price for its product which reduces competition and 
allows the more polluting firm also to charge a higher price. Collective action thus leads 
to higher prices and profits for both the firms. We have identified sufficient conditions 
under which collective action leads to higher ambient environmental quality, but lower 
consumer welfare. 
 
We assumed that both types of consumers have the same preference for the ambient 
environmental quality. It may seem more reasonable to assume instead that the high-type 
consumers have a higher preference for the ambient environmental quality. However, 
introducing such an assumption does not change the qualitative nature of our results 
except that collective action will have a stronger impact on equilibrium prices.   
 
Our analysis is driven by the assumption that there is only one firm producing the good of 
each quality. If there are several firms producing the good of low quality, collective 
action by consumers may not reduce competition much. However, it may still lead to 
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